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The Creolization of Political Theory 
and the Dialectic of Emancipatory 
Thought 
A Plea for Synthesis 
Michael Neocosmos 
Rhodes University, South Africa 
We ought to scrutinize the act by which people become a people.  
—Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract 
 
A ... people must prove, by its fighting power, its ability to set 
itself up as a nation. 
—Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth 
 
To meet the challenge of a new stage of cognition, one has to 
have full confidence in the masses, not only as force but as 
Reason—that is to say, confidence that their movement from 
practice as a form of theory does, indeed, signify that they can 
participate in the working out of a new theory.  
           —Raya Dunayevskaya, Nationalism, Communism, Marxist 
Humanism and the Afro-Asian Revolutions 
The Thought of Politics 
A political subject—by which I mean primarily the subject of a politics 
of general emancipation—is always collective.  As such it has to be 
constituted for it is never given.  Moreover, it is always self-constituted as its 
concern is humanity in the generic sense; in other words, it is oriented 
toward what humans have in common.  While always grounded in the 
particular, it therefore also possesses a universal quality distinct from all 
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particular interests.  The political subject is constitutive of politics itself.  No 
subject, no politics.  In other words, politics in this fundamental sense does 
not always exist; it is purely subjective and located in practice.  It is in fact a 
collective thought-practice.  Moreover, as the political subject is not given, it 
must be constituted in a process of becoming which suggests various states 
of non-existence and a changing state of existence.  “It was not; now it is,” so 
to speak.   
Given that this process is self-generated, it is not an expression of a 
general principle beyond itself: whether “Man,” the class struggle, history, 
state-power, discourses or whatever invariant external to it.  In other words, 
at the core of this subjective process of becoming is always a dialectic with 
the consequence that it must be understood in dialectical terms.  Finally, 
given that the process is a collective one, all component parts participate in 
this process; it is founded on the affirmation that all people think, which is to 
say that all people without exception are capable of reason.  Politics is not 
the prerogative of professional politicians or academics or other 
“representatives” formal or informal of the people who are constituting 
themselves. 
For Rousseau the name of the political subject is precisely “the people,” 
while for Fanon its name is “the nation”, or as Sekyi-Otu puts it, the 
“national-popular” or what I have preferred to call “the people-nation”1 
“which achieves the common good even as it attends to particular 
interests.”2  The foundation of the self-formation and hence of the existence 
of the people is for Rousseau the “general will,” for Fanon it is “national 
consciousness”; in either case they are concerned with the common good. 
The people may not always exist and when they do they may ultimately 
disappear in one way or another, thereby signaling the end of politics.  
“Either the will is general or it is not,” says Rousseau.3  As it is concerned 
with generic humanity, this, the core conception of politics, is concerned 
with universal freedom; the thought of politics is the thought of collective 
emancipation.  Rousseau explains: “to renounce freedom is to renounce 
one’s humanity ... if you take away all freedom of the will, you strip a man’s 
actions of all moral significance.”4  For Fanon, “…optimism in Africa is the 
direct product of the revolutionary action of the masses ... The enemy of the 
African ... is the manifestations of colonialism, whatever be the flag under 
which it asserts itself.”5  It is impossible to talk of human freedom when 
colonialism in whatever form exists.  While Rousseau has been dismissed as 
proposing a totalitarian politics, Fanon similarly has been reduced to an 
advocate of violence.  The fear of popular politics that these conceptions 
express should not surprise us given the close affinity established in the 
West between colonialism on the one hand and freedom on the other.6  The 
complacent freedom of the West having been born out of imperialism, 
colonialism, genocide, slavery and racism, it is not surprising that resistance 
to it in whatever form should be feared. This fear has contributed to the 
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absence of a thought of politics in the world today, particularly after the 
collapse of the Marxist political alternative. 
Today the absence of a thought of politics in this its fundamental 
emancipatory sense is palpable.  The thinking of politics in academia, 
principally but not exclusively, is reduced to the state while its practice 
consists in asserting interests and identities.  Whether organisations in “civil 
society” or institutions in “political society” none are concerned with the 
common good but solely with identitarian interests.  The idea of the 
common good has largely disappeared from public discourse worldwide 
and fascistic identitarian nationalisms are more and more in evidence from 
Asia to Europe, Africa and North America.  Such trends are obviously 
totally antithetical to any conceptions of the universal while the 
globalization of Western liberal democracy, relentlessly pursued as a zealous 
mission even to the extent of its imposition through military means, has 
evidently enabled this state of affairs. It is in this context that Jane Anna 
Gordon and several of her colleagues in the Caribbean Philosophical 
Association have attempted to re-direct political theory through a re-
centring of the common good precisely via a conceptualization of what they 
term the “creolization” of political theory.7  Creolization here denotes not 
only the admixture of conceptual apparatuses (Foucault’s dispositif) but 
predominantly a perspective from the Global South which re-interprets 
Western thought within a new context: that of the colonial and the neo-
colonial.8   
This is a crucially important initiative which contributes precisely to 
“shifting the geography of reason” from its erstwhile centres in the North in 
order not only to give more prominence to voices from the Global South, but 
also to begin to construct a more productive intersubjectivity at the level of 
thought between those who identify with the excluded wherever their 
Global location may be.  Creolization then forces us to think beyond the 
mere “application” of theory emanating from among colonial conceptions 
and in opposition to them, to the victims of the colonial.  Gordon is at pains 
to distinguish creolization from currently fashionable multidisciplinary or 
interdisciplinary perspectives founded as these are on multiculturalism thus 
retaining a conception of discreet and self-contained cultures that simply 
tolerate each other. Even more accurately these non-Western cultures are 
tolerated by the dominant West so long as they are not themselves 
intolerant, much as the British colonial power in Africa had insisted on non-
interference in indigenous cultures so long as these were not considered 
“repugnant” to Western sensibilities.9 
Gordon’s argument then is directed against United States academic 
political science not least in its form of comparative political theory, which, 
by contributing to an expansion of the thinkers who are now considered of 
universal theoretical significance, has expanded the academic canon.  Yet 
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she laments “but for a few important exceptions, comparative political 
theory has revolved almost exclusively around discussion between Euro-
America and the East Asian, East Indian, and Muslim worlds”, suggesting 
that it has been reformulated as an “inter-civilizational” dialogue which 
confirms Huntington’s and indeed Hegel’s “geographical estimations of 
political value and distinctive impact in the realm of historic thought.”10  
Creolizing is then developed as a “transdisciplinary alternative” to the 
claimed intellectual legitimacy of the “normal scientific community” by    
turning “to the ways in which creole languages revealed the insufficiency of 
prior academic linguistic models by demonstrating that the multilinguistic, 
multiracial, and multinational region out of which they came was 
prototypical rather than exceptional.”11 
The Analytic and the Dialectic 
Gordon’s concern is clearly with addressing the Eurocentrism and 
racism of the political science academy in the United States.  This is a vital 
endeavour; at the same time I would like to suggest that in order not to limit 
the innovative potential of creolization for the thinking of universal political 
emancipation, we build on it and expand it to include a dialectical 
dimension.  In order to make a case for this let me first outline what I see as 
the limits of analytic thought where Gordon locates creolization, and then 
turn to why I consider both Rousseau and Fanon, the core theorists 
examined “in conversation” by Gordon, as exceeding these limits.  I shall 
then end by assessing how the thought of politics can be immeasurably 
expanded by briefly considering two instances of popular thought as 
themselves inherently theoretical in the manner described by Dunayevskaya 
above. 
There are arguably two theoretical or philosophical visions of the world: 
the analytical and the dialectical.  For the analytical vision prevalent in 
universities, all thought is equated with knowledge of an object.  This is 
scientific thinking and it is equated with the production of knowledge, itself 
always seen as a thought of the objective, in other words of what objectively 
exists.  Clearly the objects of scientific academic enquiry differ according to 
the discipline in question.  There are two major features of analytic thought 
that are worth noting. 
The first such feature is classificatory or taxonomic on the foundations 
of which it becomes possible to base a comparative analysis.  The world 
itself is divided into segments to be studied by various disciplines staffed by 
professionals.  The problematic character of this procedure is particularly 
apparent in the social sciences where attempts at overcoming its evident 
limitations have taken the form of multi- or interdisciplinarity that has 
always ended in failure given precisely the taxonomic character of analytic 
thought.  Further, the reference point for any taxonomy and comparison has 
been the colonizer: the West and the white man.  Unsurprisingly, the 
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reactions by the excluded or those peripheral to the reference point and 
frequently to the general idea of scientificity that underpins it consist of an 
attempt to dethrone the reference point.  Hence the references to 
decoloniality, black thought, feminist thought, and in this instance 
creolization.  The appropriate term for this procedure is probably the “de-
centering” of the reference point or in the expression made famous by 
Dipesh Chakrabarty the “provincializing” of Europe.12   
The second feature of analytical thought as it currently exists within the 
academy is less frequently noted.  This is the fact that it is held that all 
knowledge is limited by experience; that is to say all thought must be 
verifiable by reference to empirical facts.  This is because all thought is 
knowledge and all knowledge is a thought of the objective with the result 
that only that which can be considered to exist or to have existed can be 
thought.  The result is a theoretical conservatism that limits knowledge to 
the thought of the extant.  That which does not exist empirically cannot be 
thought because it simply is not objective.   
Dialectical thought overcomes this limitation by combining in a 
contradictory manner the thought of the extant with the thought of the 
apparently impossible or inexistent that may come to exist through a process 
of becoming.  It does not reduce all thought to the knowledge of an object.  
In Alain Badiou’s words: 
The dialectical nature of philosophy is not to be reducible 
to the question of the knowledge of an object, but to 
introduce the possibility of the beginning of something 
which does not exist, which is not in the form of an object 
and which can be affirmed in its presence, in its being 
outside the form of knowledge of an object.13  
The central concept of Badiou’s thinking in this regard is the “immanent 
exception” which I have discussed at some length elsewhere.14  Briefly put, 
for Badiou, “dialectical thought does not begin from the rule but from the 
exception,”15 from the interruption of repetition, of habit; and it makes it 
possible to understand that a truly “political process is not an expression, a 
singular expression, of the objective reality but it is in some sense separated 
from this reality.”16  This concept of the “immanent exception” encapsulates 
the dialetical linking of the world as lived and its subjectivities expressive of 
social location with the asocial thought of universal equality that prevails to 
a greater or lesser extent within any emancipatory politics.  One way of 
understanding this idea is to grasp emancipatory politics as exceptional, in 
other words as “excessive” of the social; but this excess is always excessive 
of the thought of social place; hence it can only be thought as located in the 
particular.  As a result all experiences of emancipatory politics form a 
dialectic combination of expressive and excessive thought.  This dialectic 
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explains both the sequential and thus historically limited character of such 
subjectivities and also the reason for what Lazarus has called their 
“saturation,” as political subjectivity tends to reach a point where it finds it 
difficult, if not impossible, to sustain itself by providing collective solutions 
to the many problems it faces.  The prevalence of an emancipatory politics of 
the universal tends therefore to be limited in time and to be discontinuous as 
it exists in the form of discreet political sequences.17  Politics in its true sense 
of the emancipatory universalism of the common or the “commune” is thus 
not only a process of self-becoming but it is also limited in duration.  The 
problem central to politics becomes the question of how to sustain its 
process. Politics understood in this fundamental sense must be grasped as a 
real subjective process and experienced within a limited time period with a 
real capacity for subjective effects and I have shown a number of its 
manifestations in the African continent elsewhere.18 
The expressive-excessive dialectic is apparent in all forms of 
emancipatory thought whether emanating as theoretical treatises as with 
Rousseau, or as theorised accounts of popular experiences as with Fanon.  
The excessive side of the dialectic is mainly present in collective popular 
political action precisely because the reaction to political exclusion can lead 
to a thought of the universal through a challenge to the state itself.  Yet these 
theoretical contributions of mass politics are only recognizable for what they 
are if one understands that the demands of the people are not utopian or 
impossible but that they grow directly out of their own experiences.  
Therefore any thought of emancipatory politics must find a way of 
incorporating the thought of the masses when they act collectively to change 
their world, otherwise it will rarely achieve a dialectical quality.  Moreover 
the dialectic of thought enables precisely the recognition of popular thought 
by people who speak in their own name as it is opposed to the process of 
representation which contributes systematically to reducing all popular 
thought to the social.19 Emancipatory politics is dialectical or it is not. This is 
precisely what Fanon recognizes in his writings on Algeria. 
We can therefore see that there is a clear connection between the two 
proposed alternatives to analytical logic: the process of de-centring of 
thought and the idea of a thought that is not immediately reducible to the 
knowledge of an object.  Creolization as proposed by Gordon is an 
extraordinarily important response to the first feature of analytical thought 
yet it does not address the second, which requires an additional shift to the 
dialectical. 
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The Emergence of the Real of Politics and its Demise: The 
People, the Nation, and the State 
Rousseau’s intention is to think the existence of politics as such.  Politics 
exists when a subject of politics exists.  He enables us to think a real political 
subject as a dialectical process of becoming.  “The people” as a political 
subject does not exist in the world of Durkheimian social facts.  This is why 
Rousseau discards an empiricist methodology and why he begins “by laying 
all facts aside.”20  There is no absolute necessity for the people to exist even 
as a result of a social contract.  In fact in most instances “the people” does 
not exist precisely because the general will does not or has not been formed 
or has dissipated.   As Badiou puts it, “politics is a creation, local and fragile, 
of collective humanity.”21   
“Each one of us puts into the community his person and all his powers 
under the supreme direction of the general will; and as a body we 
incorporate every member as an indivisible part of the whole.”.. The public 
person thus formed by the union of all other persons was once called the city 
and is now known as the republic or the body politic.... Those who are 
associated in it take collectively the name of a people and call themselves 
individually citizens, in so far as they share in the sovereign power ... that 
man, who has hitherto thought only of himself, finds himself compelled to act on 
other principles, and to consult his reason rather than study his inclinations.22 
It is the exercise of reason that enables politics through the formation of 
a collective subject or “political community.”  As I have argued elsewhere it 
forms the basis of the thought of emancipatory politics and is open to 
everyone without exception as all people without exception are capable of 
thought, in other words of thinking beyond their interests.23   
At the same time “the body politic, no less than the body of a man 
begins to die as soon as it is born, and bears within itself the causes of its 
own destruction.”24  Thus the existence of politics is both contingent and 
limited in life; it is only a possibility as for Rousseau “necessity is always a-
political, either beforehand (the state of nature), or afterwards (dissolved 
State).”25  The general will tends to equality because inequality would 
gradually put greater emphasis on sectional interests thus tending to 
undermine the general interest and the common good.  Politics for Rousseau 
does not concern the organised representation or expression of sectional 
interests in a domain of power that reflects the social. 
Finally it is important to stress that Rousseau clearly demarcates politics 
from the state by distinguishing the collective general will from power: “the 
power indeed may be delegated, but the will cannot be.”26  Moreover laws 
can only be the product of the general will otherwise they are mere decrees. 
The general will and thus the sovereignty of the people is therefore 
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inalienable.  It follows that “sovereignty cannot be represented...[;] its 
essence is the general will, and will cannot be represented—either it is the 
general will or it is something else; there is no intermediate possibility.  Thus 
the people’s deputies are not, and could not be, its representatives; they are 
merely its agents; and they cannot decide anything finally.”27  Thus under 
what turns out to be contemporary representative democracy “as soon as 
Members (of Parliament) are elected, the people is enslaved; it is nothing” 
for the simple reason that the alienation of one’s will is quite simply 
slavery.28 “The general will derives its generality less from the number of 
voices than from the common interest which unites them.”29  The general 
will is then not a numerical majority.  Rousseau is critical of what we 
conceive as parliamentary democracy, and it is quite apparent that in 
periods of popular emancipatory politics the people simply deputize some 
of their members to speak on their behalf and expect to be briefed by them 
afterwards.  In South Africa, for example, during the mass popular upsurge 
of the 1980s, what were known as “report-backs” by delegates were insisted 
upon as it was maintained that people should have direct control over their 
own lives.30  
While I have argued that the formation of the people for Rousseau can 
be understood as an immanent exception and hence as a dialectical process, 
the same can be maintained (mutatis mutandis) for Fanon’s conception of the 
nation and indeed this is why Gordon can see them both as open to 
creolization. The only fundamental difference is that Fanon experiences this 
becoming not as an abstraction but as a real event, hence Sekyi-Otu’s 
reference to Fanon’s “dialectics of experience.”31 Gordon is absolutely 
correct to see Fanon as thinking the formation of a national consciousness as 
a concrete instantiation of Rousseau’s general will.  Where I think she is 
mistaken is to visualize the formation of this national consciousness as a 
“normative ideal” or simply “an evocative or challenging idea” to be 
pursued but presumably never attained.32 To my mind, the formation of a 
national consciousness was an absolutely real process that Fanon directly 
experienced and it must be understood as such. It arises from overcoming 
differences and uniting people politically around a common conception of 
the nation.  It is a process that was systematically fought for only later to be 
undermined as the dialectic of politics collapsed within itself from an 
emancipatory vision of the people-nation into a (not so new because 
neocolonial) nation-state.  The dialectic of political struggle began by 
stressing the universal and ended in the formation of a particularistic 
nationalism propounded by state ideology; it began as the becoming of an 
inclusive creolized national consciousness guided by a pan-African ideology 
inter alia and ended, through a process of de-politicization, in a xenophobic 
statist particularism.  This real process illustrates precisely the historically 
sequential and therefore limited character of all emancipatory politics and 
has been replicated elsewhere, notably in South Africa.33 
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To briefly resume an argument which I have made at length 
elsewhere34, Fanon shows that the given social relations in the colonial 
setting which he terms “Manichean” are transformed in struggle by the 
people themselves and the militants who guide the process through their 
work among the rural masses primarily.  The subjective dualism organised 
around the dichotomy colonizer-colonized is transformed in struggle. “The 
idyllic, unreal clarity of the beginning is followed by a penumbra which 
dislocates consciousness.... The people find out that the iniquitous fact of 
exploitation can assume a black face, or an Arab one” and that “many 
members of the mass of colonialists reveal themselves to be much, much 
closer to the national struggle than certain sons of the nation.”35  The 
outcome of the process is thus the rise of a purely political national 
consciousness: “The living expression of the nation is the moving 
consciousness of the whole of the people; it is the coherent and enlightened 
praxis of men and women.  The collective construction of a destiny is the 
assumption of responsibility on a historical scale.”36 
This is indeed a real process of becoming.  For Fanon the reality of the 
self-becoming of the nation is stated absolutely unambiguously (although 
his words have been distorted by the translator).  He says: “This new reality 
which the colonized will now come to know exists only in action.”37  It being 
a dialectical political process, its reality can only be experienced as practice.  
It should perhaps be recalled that Fanon’s is not a narrative after the event.  
It is a description of the real of emancipatory politics.  I can affirm this with 
all the more confidence because I had the privilege of having exactly the 
same experience as Fanon in South Africa during the 1980s.  There also a 
“New Nation” was formed as a direct result of popular mass politics.38  
Moreover the same kind of experience has been recounted more recently for 
example in Haiti with the experience of the popular enthusiasm enabled by 
Lavalas (2000), in Tahrir Square in Cairo (2011), and with Abahlali 
baseMjondolo in Durban (2005).  The reality of the formation of a new nation 
is also made visible not only by the overcoming of various ethnic, gender, 
and other divisions (Badiou refers to this as “movement communism,”)39 
but the nation thus constructed includes many non-indigenous people 
simply because its conception is not identitarian.  If I were to make the point 
in a more philosophical manner I would say that the real is precisely what is 
considered impossible by the world as it exists; in other words the 
movement beyond place through the unification of a nation in popular 
practice names the possibility of the impossible.  People were only “things” 
under colonial domination40, now they form themselves as a people and 
thus declare: “We the people ….”41 
Gordon is entirely correct to see this process as a process of 
creolization.42  It is a similar idea to that which Saint-Just captured in 1793 
when he stated that “the homeland of a free people is open to all men of the 
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world.”43  Fanon and others among the non-indigenous were able to see 
themselves as Algerian precisely because the idea of the nation was non-
identitarian but purely composed of those politically committed to freedom.  
Yet at the same time this process of creolization was not to last, and was to 
lose its inclusive character, to become what could be called a creolized 
particular culture rather than a creolized universal politics. 
In order to account for the end of the process and its reversal, Fanon 
tends to rely on objective factors external to the people, namely the character 
of the national bourgeoisie (by which he means the native bourgeoisie and 
not an anti-imperialist bourgeoisie) and the nationalist party which it 
controls.  While the former’s interests ultimately lead to xenophobic 
nationalism, the latter “which used to call itself the servant of the people, 
which used to claim that it worked for the full expression of the people’s will, as 
soon as the colonial power puts the country into its control hastens to send 
the people back to their caves.”44   
Simultaneously the national bourgeoisie excludes itself from the nation; 
it is unable “to comprehend popular praxis, in other words to understand its 
rationality”45 so that finally it excludes itself from the people themselves, as 
it is “only a sort of greedy caste, avid and voracious, with the mind of a 
huckster, only too glad to accept the dividends that the former colonial 
power hands out to it.  This get-rich-quick bourgeoisie shows itself incapable 
of great ideas or inventiveness.  It remembers what it has read in European 
textbooks and imperceptibly it becomes not even the replica of Europe, but 
its caricature….”46 
For Fanon the core reasons for the collapse of popular national 
consciousness are to be found in the economic interests of the national 
bourgeoisie who wish to move into the posts and the businesses vacated by 
the departing Europeans.  As a result, they assert a form of nationalism (he 
calls it “narrow”) based on race and indigeneity in order to exclude; their 
concern is with access to resources, and a claim to indigeneity and racism is 
from their perspective the only legitimate way of privately accessing such 
resources.  Fanon notes that “the racial prejudice of the young national 
bourgeoisie is a racism of defence, based on fear.”47  In any case, whether the 
concern is accumulation or whether it is asserting a “narrow” racially based 
nationalism, “the sole slogan of the bourgeoisie is ‘Replace the foreigner!’.”48 
As a result: “the working class of the towns, the masses of the unemployed, 
the small artisans and craftsmen for their part line up behind this nationalist 
attitude; but in all justice let it be said, they only follow in the steps of their 
bourgeoisie.  If the national bourgeoisie goes into competition with the 
Europeans, the artisans and craftsmen start a fight against non-national 
Africans… the foreigners are called to leave; their shops are burned, their 
street stalls are wrecked.”49 
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In sum, it is the national bourgeoisie that is, for Fanon, at the basis of the 
formation of an exclusionary conception of the nation-state now founded on 
conceptions of indigeneity or autochthony.  The simultaneous de-
politicization of the masses ensures the success of this process.  Ultimately 
this is an argument of “betrayal,” which is simply a statement of fact.  Yet it 
would be more accurate to note the fact that the national bourgeoisie can 
only become a political subject (and thus act politically) through its control 
of the state via the party, itself a state institution.  Amílcar Cabral in this 
instance was more theoretically accurate than Fanon when he noted that “the 
problem of the nature of the state created after independence is perhaps the secret of 
the failure of African independence.”50  Clearly Fanon recognizes that there has 
then been an obvious political shift from the idea of the people-nation 
central to a universalistic politics of freedom and embodied in an inclusive 
national consciousness, to that of the nation-state where the thought of the 
nation as an ethnic particularism predominates.  However, this return to a 
Manichean conception requires an end to the dialectic and its replacement 
by a purely expressive subjectivity.   The answer to the problem must then 
be a subjective one and not simply an objective one.  Fanon’s argument in 
this regard is therefore limited. 
What is the subjective operator that enables the end of the dialectic? 
That makes the saturation of an emancipatory political subjectivity possible, 
and hence that enables a return to a purely expressive subjectivity typical of 
state thinking?  This operator is inherent in popular subjectivity itself and 
the collapse of the expressive-excessive dialectic is not simply reducible to 
an external cause such as the state or the national bourgeoisie as Fanon 
maintains.  Rather we can follow Lazarus in describing it as a saturation of a 
mode of politics, as a crisis in thought.51 It can be seen as the inability of the 
dialectic to sustain a commitment to universality thus reverting to an 
expressive subjectivity. As Rousseau clearly tells us, the answer to the above 
question is to be found within the people itself, in the idea of 
“representation,” for a represented people is no longer a people; it has 
transferred its will to the state via the medium of a party.  Whether we refer 
to the FLN in Algeria or to the ANC in South Africa, they each saw 
themselves and were seen as “the unique representatives of their people” to 
use the formulation made famous by the United Nations in its resolutions.  
The fact that the people also saw them as their representatives is not in 
doubt either, but by so doing it lost its independent existence as a political 
subject and reverted to passivity.  In South Africa the emancipatory self-
formation of a national consciousness was also gradually replaced, from the 
late 1980s onward, by conceptions of politics founded on representation.  
The result has been the growth and ideological dominance since then of an 
exclusionary xenophobic state nationalism.52 
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In sum, if we admit that this process of becoming of a universal 
subjectivity is a real one forming an expressive-excessive dialectic and not a 
normative ideal, then we are led to recognize that it cannot be conceived as 
forming part of a (linear) process of state formation (as the post-
independence state never tires of repeating) but indeed quite the opposite—
a process of popular emancipatory politics.  Moreover, it then becomes 
absolutely clear why the post-independence state must engage in a process 
of de-politicization of the people in order to sustain its rule and in the 
process react to the emancipatory subjectivity by insisting (through the 
deployment of ideology, law and state violence) that it must be seen as its 
sole agent.  In the process it turns a genuine politics of universal 
emancipation into a simulacrum of itself for now, under the hegemony of 
state identitarian subjectivities, it loses its universal character in favour of 
autochthony.  Thus, it seems to me, that to visualise egalitarian universal 
politics as simply a normative ideal is to overlook the fundamental reality of 
the dialectic. 
The Popular Masses as Producers of Theory in Practice 
Here I will be concerned to illustrate two points. First the idea that if, as 
Dunayevskaya insists, all emancipatory politics must have confidence in the 
masses as creators of theory and not solely as sources of force, then 
dialectical thought is an absolute requirement. Second and following from 
this, the important idea that the creolization of culture must be rigorously 
distinguished from the creolization of politics as the former is concerned 
with the formation of a new particularity and the latter with universality.   
In particular, we must be careful not to apprehend the latter as an expression 
of the former; emancipatory politics could in fact be central to the formation 
of culture. 
The theoretical inventions of the popular masses do not often take a 
written form but it is important to attempt an elucidation of their theoretical 
content while also saving them from the limitations of anthropological 
discourse.  Moreover, I would suggest that an understanding of popular 
political inventions is absolutely crucial, as an emancipatory future cannot 
be thought without an overcoming of the intellectual divisions of labour.  In 
what follows I draw on two examples that I have discussed at greater length 
elsewhere in order to illustrate briefly what I mean.53 
In a rather romantic but nevertheless very pertinent observation 
Rousseau states: “When we see among the happiest people in the world 
bands of peasants regulating the affairs of state under an oak tree, and 
always acting wisely, can we help feeling a certain contempt for the 
refinement of other nations...?”54  An example of the popular formation of a 
universal politics of freedom is the palaver or Mbongi as it has existed among 
BaKongo people in particular.  Dismissed by colonial power as a waste of 
time, the popular assembly of the palaver (from palavra in Portuguese) was 
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directly concerned with the political problem of the (re-)creation of unity in 
the community particularly after periods of crisis.  This particular example 
illustrates a totally participatory popular process which emphasizes 
egalitarianism as the political solution to contradictions within African 
communities: the “true essence ... [of the palaver is] freedom.”55 The palaver, 
when run in a truly free manner, can be said to be a site of excessive politics 
at the local level, as it occurs at a distance from state thinking (both colonial 
and postcolonial) and embodies a concept of universal humanity.  The 
following points stressed by Wamba-dia-Wamba should be particularly 
noted. A palaver: 
is a collective/individual cleaning-up of people as 
community (physically, biologically, anthropologically, 
sociologically and spiritually) . . . The palaver appears as a 
mass bursting of active involvement in matters of the 
entire community and of “free” or “liberated” (i.e. with no 
taboos, no restrictions, no diplomacy, etc.) speaking . . . 
When a palaver is artificially organised by oppressive 
ruling powers, however, it degenerates into a formal 
exercise without life and (de)void of mass spontaneous 
creativity: people speak, as it is said, with “tied tongues” 
or with “tongues in the cheek.”56 
The description is clear: a palaver involves everyone equally; otherwise, 
if organized under the aegis of the powerful, a politics of interest is practised 
in order not to offend them and the palaver fails to resolve contradictions. A 
palaver is egalitarian and democratic, or not at all. The palaver requires of 
and provides to each community member the right to carry out, and the 
obligation to be subjected to, an integral critique of/by everyone without 
exception.57 Important “conflicts, emerging in, and threatening the 
life/existence of the community qua community, need to be resolved with 
appropriate methods.”58 To resolve contradictions elicited by both internal 
and external forces, a struggle takes place over whom the ancestors 
represent. The dominant members of the community “present themselves as 
the real servants ... of the powers of the ancestors.... It is claimed that ... the 
ancestors [speak] through them, and the masses of the community must 
obey them without question and reservation.”59 Other members of the 
community oppose this, and invoke the view of the ancestors through 
visions and dreams that affirm that “the community has deviated from the 
ancestral line.”60 They do this because “to evoke the ancestors is to re-affirm 
their line, the one which allowed the community to reproduce.”61 The 
ancestral line is, for them, founded on equality. The palaver, therefore, 
through its struggle around the meaning of the ancestral line, helps to 
resolve social conflicts and re-establish social egalitarian balance. To do so, it 
combines political processes with cultural representations, forms and rituals 
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that constitute a complex language through which the palaver can be 
understood and, therefore, succeed.  It may take place over a long period of 
several weeks, whatever is necessary for contradictions to be resolved and 
for the ‘body politic’ of the community to be healed. 
It is not surprising that the palaver was seen as a threat to the colonial 
power as well as to those aiming to set themselves above the people; both 
wished to undermine the institution. The eventual infrequency in the calling 
of palavers has been a symptom of the failure to sustain a universal politics 
and the consequent gradual decline of excessive thought within popular 
African communities.  Palavers exist in various forms still in Africa and 
express the hard fought-over democratic politics that enable the sustaining 
of a people.62    A politics of equality must nevertheless be fought for in its 
process of doing.  In the words of Jacques Rancière, “equality is not given, it 
is processual. And it is not quantitative, it is qualitative.”63  Even though 
culture may embody it as a potential, there is no given necessity for this 
potential to be realized and such a realization is impossible outside 
collective political action.  The theoretical innovations of palaver politics 
include not only the thinking of politics as the democratic formation of a 
people through an egalitarian process along with the rituals and activities 
which necessarily surround the process, but also of a distinct conception of 
time more attuned to human existence than to the market. As Badiou puts it: 
“There is a necessary slowness, both democratic and popular in nature, 
which is particular to the time of the correct handling of contradictions 
among the people.”64  
The complex interplay between culture and politics can also be 
observed in relation to the egalitarian struggles of the Haitian Bossales (who 
originated overwhelmingly from among the BaKongo) as opposed to the 
Créoles in the period following independence in 1804.  Writing in the 
tradition of rural culture inaugurated by Jean Price-Mars, Gérard 
Barthélemy shows how a specifically egalitarian society was fought for by 
the ex-slaves and their descendants founded on family land holdings.65 
According to Barthélemy, it is precisely the exceptional character of a society 
of freed ex-slaves that explains the “egalitarian system without a state” that 
gradually emerged in rural Haiti after independence.66 The African-born 
bossales managed to acquire ownership of peasant parcels and the plantation 
estate system was largely destroyed. The process began in 1809 and was 
initiated by Pétion, who ruled the south of the country while (King) 
Christophe ruled the north. The forced-labor system was abandoned and 
large private estates were broken up and leased to peasant sharecroppers.67 
As a result, no latifundia developed in Haiti, unlike in most of post-
independence Latin America and the Caribbean. The masses of Haitians 
(bossales) insisted on establishing a parcel-owning peasantry to anchor their 
political independence in economic independence—largely successfully as it 
turns out—so that the new bourgeoisie (créoles) was deprived of direct access 
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to surplus labour. A merchant bourgeoisie then developed that extracted 
surplus from beyond the peasant system, and it is on this class that the state 
was founded.68 
Within peasant society itself, a number of methods of self-regulation—
largely of African origin—enabled the restriction of socio-economic 
differentiation and the prevalence of a system of equality that remained at a 
subjective distance from state and capitalist individualist subjectivities. 
These methods included unpaid collective forms of work, witchcraft and 
secret societies, a common religious ideology, and family socialization.69 In 
fact Barthélemy makes the point that, from 1804 onward, it gradually 
became understood by the bossales that “the only alternative to the colonial 
hierarchical system is that of equality, more so than that of liberty, as while 
the latter enables freedom from external oppression, it is not able to take on 
board the ideological content of the system.”70  He insists that, while Haitian 
rural society is generally understood as a failure, as wedded to traditions 
and poverty, it is in fact a highly organized social system that is self-
regulating without an institutionalized state structure. In order to achieve this, 
it had to keep hierarchical Creole society and the formal state at a distance, 
to block all attempts at individual enrichment and power-seeking, and to 
harmonize the group through a kind of automatic regulation of individual 
behavior; “all this outside any ‘political’ dimension’ of state control.”71 In 
this way the Haitian bossales constituted themselves as a distinct country: le 
pays endeyo (the country outside). It has been noted that this egalitarian 
system, “functioned ... from the late 1790s to the 1960s until the destruction 
of the Haitian (natural and social) environment under the regime of Papa 
Doc (Duvalier) undermined its viability,” through the re-installing of 
colonial domination and the systematic use of terror.72 
Barthélemy refers to this kind of politics as a new form of “marronage, a 
counter-culture, a structural and collective reaction of flight.”73  But these 
politics actually invented a new creolized culture through distancing its 
thought from any form of state while simultaneously being rooted in local 
traditions of resistance to oppression.   It can be maintained that, in this case, 
a creolized politics of universality preceded a creolized culture which it is 
important to realize is always a particularity.  Commonly, this new 
subjectivity was expressed in proverbs or sayings, the most important of 
which was Tout moun se moun men ce pa memn moun, which, loosely 
translated, means “Every person is a person even though they are not the 
same person.”   Barthélemy explains this as a statement governing the 
worldview of the Haitian rural people, for it is more than a simple proverb 
and reflects a fought-for rule of social and political practice.74 The point is 
that equality cannot exist without difference and that, correspondingly, 
difference makes no sense without equality. “In order to be different, not to 
be memn moun, each man must begin by identifying what he has in common 
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with others; what is the basic identity from which variations can be felt, 
interpreted and used.”75 While these variations obviously exist, they are 
restricted from becoming hierarchical through group reactions that limit the 
entrenchment of these forms of behaviour; these reactions include “the 
attribution to one person of various statuses in different contexts.”76 “A 
good reputation, [social] behaviour, personal relations, all contribute to 
balancing out the purely quantitative [differences],” and consequently 
identification is sought with the reference point of a “middle-peasant” (moun 
mouayen).77 
The bossales collectively (i.e. politically) invented new forms of living; 
they corroborrated the view that emancipation, as Jacques Rancière has 
argued, is not a future to be attained but an inventive way of doing.  As he 
has put it recently: “Emancipation has always been a way of inventing, 
amidst the ‘normal’ course of time another time, another manner of 
inhabiting the sensible world in common. It has always been a way of living 
in the present in another world instead of deferring its possibility.”78 
Concluding Remark 
The theoretical inventions in Africa and Haiti help to corroborate the 
view argued here that in order for an emancipatory politics to be thinkable 
we need to synthesize the insights of an approach to the thought of politics 
founded on creolization with a dialectic.  Gordon’s impassioned plea for the 
creolization of theory is of immeasurable value, but in the absence of the 
explicit inclusion of a dialectic it may limit itself unduly to an analytical 
vision.  I have tried to suggest here that such a limitation affects two main 
features of thought: the real of a politics of universal freedom, however 
limited its duration, and the theoretical inventions of popular actions.  My 
plea for synthesis between the creolization of theory and the dialectic is then 
founded on nothing else but the necessity to make emancipatory thought 
possible today. 
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